A Functional Verification based Fault Injection Environment by Benso A. et al.
05 August 2020
POLITECNICO DI TORINO
Repository ISTITUZIONALE
A Functional Verification based Fault Injection Environment / Benso A.; BOSIO A.; Di Carlo S.; Mariani R.. - STAMPA. -
(2007), pp. 114-122. ((Intervento presentato al convegno IEEE 22nd International Symposium on Defect and Fault
Tolerance in VLSI Systems (DFTS) tenutosi a Roma, IT nel 26-28 Sept. 2007.
Original
A Functional Verification based Fault Injection Environment
Publisher:
Published
DOI:10.1109/DFT.2007.31
Terms of use:
openAccess
Publisher copyright
(Article begins on next page)
This article is made available under terms and conditions as specified in the  corresponding bibliographic description in
the repository
Availability:
This version is available at: 11583/1818483 since:
IEEE Computer Society
A Functional Verification based Fault Injection Environment 
 
 
A. Benso*, A. Bosio*, S. Di Carlo*, R. Mariani+ 
*Politecnico di Torino ,Dipartimento di Automatica e Informatica, Torino, Italy 
+Yogitech S.p.A, San Martino Ulmiano Pisa (Italy) 
{alfredo.benso, alberto.bosio, stefano.dicarlo}@polito.it 
riccardo.mariani@yogitech.com 
Abstract 
Fault injection is needed for different purposes such as analyzing the reaction of a system 
in a faulty environment or validating fault-detection and/or fault-correction techniques. In 
this paper we propose a simulation-based fault injection tool able to work at different 
abstraction levels and with user-defined fault models. By exploiting the facilities provided by 
a functional verification environment it allows to speed up the entire fault injection process: 
from the creation of the workload to the analysis of the results of injection campaigns. 
Moreover, the adoption of techniques to optimize the fault list significantly reduces the 
simulation time. Being the tool targeted to the validation of dependable systems, it includes a 
way to extract information from the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and to correlate fault 
injection results with estimates. 
1. Introduction 
Dependability analysis [1] is a concern for Integrated Circuits (IC) designers and 
manufacturers since erroneous behaviors were first reported in space applications in the mid 
70’s. Phenomena such as alpha particles or heavy ion strikes may lead to dramatic 
consequences and their occurrence increases with technology downscaling [2]. It is thus 
mandatory to early analyze the behavior of digital circuits employed in critical applications 
(avionics, automotive, etc.)  affected by these phenomena [3-5]. Fault-injection experiments 
have demonstrated as one of the most effective approaches for IC dependability evaluation 
[5-9]. The international norm IEC61508 [10], regulating the requirements of safety-related 
systems, highly recommends fault-injection in all steps of the development process. 
Nevertheless, setting up a fault-injection environment is not trivial and requires to tune 
different parameters (e.g. the fault model, the fault list, the workload, the outputs used as 
readout points, and the way experimental results are interpreted) that can strongly influence 
the coherency and the meaningfulness of the final results. 
Different fault-injection techniques have been proposed and used in the past. They can be 
grouped in three different categories: (i) simulation-based, (ii) software-based, and (iii) 
hardware-based. Simulation-based fault injection [11-13], injects faults in a simulative model 
of the target system. It allows early and detailed dependability analysis and it can be applied 
when a prototype is not yet available. Moreover, it actually allows modeling any type of fault. 
However, it is very time-consuming and the effectiveness depends on the accuracy of the 
system model. Software-based fault-injection [6-7] [14] targets microprocessor-based systems 
and resorts to modifications of the software, executed by the microprocessor, to inject faults 
and to observe their effect. It significantly speeds up the fault injection process. Finally, 
hardware based fault-injection uses hardware platforms (mainly FPGA based) to inject faults 
[15-17]. It notably speeds up the injection process w.r.t. simulation and software based 
approaches; nevertheless, it requires a synthesizable model of the system and sometime it is 
difficult to apply. 
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This paper exploits the use of coverage-driven functional verification to build an efficient 
simulation-based fault-injection environment. Coupling fault-injection with functional 
verification allows to overcome some of the drawbacks affecting existing environments, such 
as hard reusability or adaptability to different designs and/or fault models. Verification 
components available on the market can be easily reused as workloads to inject faults, 
obtaining at the same time design validation and reliability evaluation. Moreover, the use of 
standard verification languages enables an easy and configurable way to model injected faults 
and, by adopting dedicated techniques to collapse faults in the fault list, to reduce the fault list 
size and therefore the required injection time. Finally, coverage-driven functional verification 
allows to uniquely correlating workloads, operational profiles, fault list, and final measures. 
The proposed solution is intended to work with any functional verification EDA tool 
available on the market. In this paper, we will refer to Specman Elite ® by Cadence™ [18] 
(Specman for short in the remaining of the paper), together with the IEEE e Standard 
Verification Language [19] as a reference example. This research work has been performed in 
the framework of an implementation of a complete flow (analysis and validation with fault-
injection) to extend Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to System On Chip. This 
flow has then been used during the design of “robust” microcontrollers for automotive 
applications [20][21]. 
The paper is organized as follow: Section 2 introduces the overall architecture of the fault 
injector environment, Section 3 to 7 detail each required step to setting up the fault-injection 
flow. Section 8 gives some experimental results, while Section 9 concludes the paper. 
2. The fault-injector architecture 
This paragraph overviews the overall architecture (see Figure 1) of the proposed fault-
injection environment. The main idea is to provide high flexibility and to allow reliability 
assessment at different stages of the design process and design levels. 
 
Figure 1: Fault-injection environment overall architecture 
The fault injector is basically composed of a fault free (Golden) and a faulty Device 
Under Test (DUT) simulated in parallel and sharing the same workload. They can be 
described using any type of hardware description language (e.g. VHDL, Verilog, etc.) 
provided with a simulator able to interface with the selected functional verification tool. 
The fault-injection flow starts from a list of sensible zones (SENS), i.e., sites of the 
DUT where to inject faults, and a set of observation/diagnostic points (OBSE/DIAG), 
i.e., sites where to observe the effects of the injected faults. They can be either internal 
nets or external pins of the DUT. An OBSE is a site where to measure the result of an 
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injection in terms of the difference w.r.t. the corresponding point in the golden DUT. A 
DIAG is a site where to measure the result of an injection based on the occurrence (or 
not) of a given event. Typically, DIAGs are outputs of logic blocks inserted to increase 
the fault tolerance of the system. By monitoring these sites, it is possible to understand 
their detection/correction capability. This initial input (i.e., list of SENSs, OBSEs, and 
DIAGs) can be provided either by the user or obtained from a Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) [21][22], if available. The FMEA is a methodology to analyze 
potential dependability problems early in the development cycle when it is easy to find 
solutions. It provides a list of potential failing points, failure modes and classification 
of hazards easy to translate into SENSs, OBSEs, and DIAGSs. The Environment builder 
(see Figure 1) collects this information and setup the initial injection environment 
needed to generate the target fault list. The proposed architecture allows two different 
solutions for the generation of the fault list: 
• Random generation: faults are randomly (through the Randomizer block) selected 
from the complete list of fault locations; 
• Operational profile based: faults are identified based on Operational Profiles and 
then collapsed in order to reduce the overall fault list size and to reduce the final 
experiment duration. The Operational Profiler and the Collapser are in charge of 
performing this operation (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2 for the details). 
The Fault Injection Manager (see Section 6) finally performs the injection 
experiments. It runs an iterative process selecting a single fault at a time from the fault 
list and injecting the fault into the faulty DUT during the application of the target 
workload. The simulation of the Faulty and the Golden DUTs are then continuously 
monitored by a set of so called monitors instantiated by the Environmental Builder. The 
outputs of the monitors are finally used by the Result Analyzer to estimate the final 
coverage (see Section 7). The remaining sections of the paper will detail the 
characteristics of the main elements composing the proposed fault-injection 
environment. 
3. Fault model 
The choice of the target fault model is a key point in setting up a fault-injection campaign. 
Real faults are influenced by different factors such as the target system technology and the 
environmental working conditions and they can be classified in many different ways. The 
flexibility of the IEEE e standard Verification Language [19] adopted by Specman (or any 
other verification language), can be exploited to model faults. It allows the user to describe 
complex faulty behaviors, not only at the gate level, but also at higher abstraction levels (e.g. 
a glitch in a given data bus signal as a consequence of a given condition on the address bus). 
This is the first advantage gained from the use of the IEEE e standard Verification Language 
together with Specman to build our fault-injection environment. Each fault is modeled with a 
function called by the fault-injection manger. The function receives different parameters 
depending on the selected fault model. Figure 2 shows the e code modeling a Single Event 
Upset (SEU). This simple code waits until the injection event (inj_event) becomes true 
and then flips the state of the target location inj_port. 
 
<' 
 inject ()@clk is { 
  wait inj_event; 
  inj_port = ! inj_port;  
 };  
'> 
Figure 2: e code modeling a SEU 
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4. Workload Generator 
After selecting the target fault model, another challenge in performing fault-injection 
experiments is the identification of a meaningful workload to apply to the target DUT during 
the injections. It is possible to identify two different types of workloads: 
• Mission Oriented: the experiments are performed to evaluate the dependability of 
the DUT when executing its “mission” application. In this case the workload can be 
either partially or totally fixed (it is the application itself, e.g. a software) and parts 
of the system may not be considered in the experiments because they are not excited 
by the application; 
• Device-oriented: the experiments are performed to evaluate the dependability of the 
device, regardless its mission application. In this case the workload must be 
generated so to functionally exercise all the parts of the device. 
In case of device oriented fault-injection, again the facilities provided by a functional 
verification tool (i.e., Specman) and in particular by its test generation engine may help 
generating high quality test benches. In fact, the goal of the workload generation is to come 
up with a set of patterns able to activate all (or a subset of) the different parts of the target 
system in different possible ways. It is actually very similar to the goal pursued in a 
functional verification flow. For example, in Specman, the test generation engine is based on 
a random generator that can be driven and constrained in a very flexible way, in order to 
explore corner-cases and particular critical situations. Moreover it is possible to reuse 
functional verification test benches written using the IEEE e standard Verification Language 
[19] or even different languages (it can also include software). The completeness of the 
workload is automatically measured by using coverage monitors on sensible zones and 
observation points as described in Section 7. A workload is considered complete if all the 
sensible zones are excited at least once, and all the observation point monitors are triggered at 
least once. 
5. Fault List Generator 
As already introduced in Section 2, starting from the list of sensible zones it is 
possible to generate the target fault list for the injection campaign. The idea is to 
provide the user with two different approaches. 
The first possibility is the random generation performed trough the Randomizer 
block of Figure 1. In this case, a subset of the complete set F of possible faults is 
randomly chosen to compose the target fault list. Each selected fault f ∈ F is identified 
by its fault location (SENS) and injection time. The use of the random approach allows 
reducing the fault-injection environment setup time but it may not lead to optimal 
results. Actually, this approach uniformly distributes faults in different 
locations/execution times regardless the real importance of the target zone for the 
behavior of the application. The alternative to the random fault generation is an 
operational profile based fault list generation [23]. An Operational Profile (OP) is a 
collection of information about relevant fault-free system activities. Traced information 
is read/write activities associated with signals, or system elements (register, buses, 
memory elements, etc.), but they may also include other more high level information 
like the most probable expected sets of inputs that the system or application should 
receive. Essentially, the purpose of the operational profile is to better understand the 
conditions in which the system or the application has to work (the workload), and then 
to analyze this information to target only faults that actually may lead to errors. This 
approach allows to compact the fault list and to consider non-trivial faults only. In 
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particular, faults that lead to predictable effects, such as “no effect”, are kept in the 
fault list (they still contribute to the final measures) but not injected. The achievable 
fault list reduction factor depends on the workload and on the complexity of the device 
under test. We can therefore split the fault list generation into three different steps: (i) 
the OP generation, (ii) the analysis of the OP and the generation of the compacted fault 
list, (iii) the optional use of the randomizer to randomly select faults from the 
compacted list. This last step is used only if the size of the compacted fault list is still 
too high for the computational resources. The following subsections will detail the OP 
generation and the OP analysis steps. 
5.1. Operational Profile Generation 
An Operational Profile (OP) is an instrument to optimize the execution time of a 
fault-injection experiment. It consists of a collection of information (log) about relevant 
fault-free system activities on each potential fault location of the target system when 
the selected workload is applied. Logged activities include read/write associated with 
any element of the DUT model (signals, variables, registers, buses, etc.). Information is 
collected using simulator breakpoints. The operational profiler generates the script to 
trace the proper signals (including the breakpoint instructions able to log when a 
location is accessed by the DUT either for a write or a read operation). 
As an example Figure 3 shows part of a VHDL code representing a FIFO core where 
we want to trace read and write memory accesses, i.e. operations on the ram variable. It 
is easy to see that we have two locations to trace: at row 58 (Figure 3) a write of ram 
occurs whereas at row 66 a read of ram occurs. The simulator commands used to log 
the two locations are shown in Figure 4. This example is based on Cadence NCSIM 
simulator; it instruments one breakpoint (stop) for each accessed location. 
56. if (clock'event and clock = '1') then 
57.  if ((write_enb = '1') and  (full = '0')) then 
58.   ram(w_ptr) := data_in; 
59.   empty <= '0'; 
60.   w_ptr:= (w_ptr + 1) mod (16); 
61.   if ( r_ptr = w_ptr ) then 
62.    full <= '1'; 
63.   end if; 
64.  end if; 
65.  if ((read_enb = '1') and (empty = '0')) then 
66.   data_out <= ram(r_ptr); 
67.   full <= '0'; 
68.   r_ptr := (r_ptr + 1) mod (16); 
69.   if ( r_ptr = w_ptr ) then 
70.    empty <= '1'; 
71.   end if; 
72.  end if; 
73. end if; 
Figure 3: VDHL FIFO RAM code 
 
set fileid [open "./oplist.txt" w ] 
scope -set $HDL_location_path 
stop -line 58 -all -silent -continue  -execute {puts $fileid 
"$HDL_location_path:ram([value %d w_ptr]), write, [time NS]"} 
stop -line 66 -all -silent -continue  -execute {puts $fileid 
"$HDL_location_path:ram([value %d r_ptr]), read, [time NS]"} 
Figure 4: Simulator script example 
The result of this script is reported in Figure 5. 
:router1:queue_0:fifo_core:ram(0), write, 5350 NS 
:router1:queue_0:fifo_core:ram(8), read, 5350 NS 
Figure 5 : Operational profile 
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5.2. Operational Profile Generation 
The information contained in the OP can be efficiently used to collapse the fault list 
associated with a given DUT and a given list of sensible zones with a consequent 
reduction of the simulation time. This is possible by introducing additional constraints 
to avoid the selection of inactive fault locations. 
For example, let us consider transient faults (e.g. SEU). A fault location is sensitive 
at a given time t1 if the next operation performed on the same location at time t2>t1 is a 
read operation (i.e., it does not overwrite the effect of the fault). Therefore, in case of 
transient faults, for each fault location, the period between a read and a write operation 
is inactive (no faults need to be injected). Figure 6 shows an example of an OP analysis. 
The given OP shows that a selected fault location (e.g. a flip-flop) is read at simulation 
time 20, 30, and 60 and written at simulation time 10, 40, 50, and 70. Using the 
constraint previously introduced the only intervals available for the injection are: 
10<tinj<20, 30<tinj<40 and 50<tinj<60. 
WRWWRRW
Fault Location
70605040302010
 
Figure 6: Collapsing example 
Injecting in other time instants (e.g. 40 or 50) would be useless since the fault would 
be overwritten by the next write operation. Moreover, to further reduce the size of the 
target fault list, the user can specify “condition” signals for injection, called “effect 
condition” and “no effect condition”: a fault must be injected in these zones only if the 
“effect condition” signal is “true”. A detailed explanation of the proposed approach can 
be found in [24]. Moreover, the user can implement his collapsing rules based on his 
fault models. 
6. Fault-Injection Manager 
The Fault-Injection Manager performs the actual injection of faults inside the DUT. It 
resorts to the full controllability and observability of DUT internal signals provided by 
the functional verification tool. One fault at a time is injected; based on the fault model 
the injection engine stops the simulation, injects the fault (i.e., it executes the 
verification code that model the injected fault as described in Section 3), and then 
resumes the simulation. At the same time observation points (OBSEs/DIAGs) behavior 
are logged for later analysis. An interesting improvement is the use of so called “stop 
run” timers. They control the behavior of each simulation during the injection campaign 
in order to reduce the total simulation time. Examples of stop timers are: a timer stops 
the simulation if the simulation time exceeds the expected test bench duration; a timer 
stops the simulation after a given period after the injection of a given fault if no activity 
has been detected on the observation/diagnostic points, etc.  
7. Result Analyzer 
The result analyzer evaluates the result of the fault-injection, i.e., the reaction of the 
system to the injected faults. The analysis is based on the information collected by the 
monitors placed on OBSEs and DIAGs (see Section 2). Fault effects can be classified 
based on the circuit functionality in two ways: “failure” and “no-effect”. The failure can 
119
manifest as a “data mismatch” or a “time alteration” between the golden and the faulty 
DUT. In case of no-effect the error is overwritten or corrected by a fault tolerance 
mechanism and, it does not propagate in the circuit. In this case, the use of DIAGs 
(Section 2) allows understanding if the circuit really tolerates the fault. In case of data 
mismatch the faulty DUT produces a wrong output w.r.t. the golden DUT. In this case 
the error has been propagated to the output of the circuit generating a wrong behavior. 
In the last situation, i.e., timing alteration, the circuit produces a correct result but with 
different timings. Depending on the constraints of the application and the introduced 
overhead this situation may be acceptable or not. 
Another important measure provided by the result analyzer is a so called coverage. In 
the fault-injection terminology, the coverage is defined as the probability of system 
recovery when a fault appears, i.e., saying that a system has a fault-coverage of 99% 
means that over the totality of the injected faults, only 1% resulted in an error or 
failure. However, given the complexity of modern systems, it is necessary to provide 
more accurate measures. The traditional coverage is not a real assessment of the system 
reliability without a correlation with the “accuracy” of the fault list. In general, the 
smaller the fault-list is, the less accurate the final reliability measures are. We introduce 
the verification concept of functional coverage defined as a systematic procedure to 
assess how and how much each verification item, or specification requirement, has been 
covered by the tests. These verification items are in fact called “coverage items”, and 
they depend on the system architecture and also on the application running on the 
system itself. We can therefore define a “cross-coverage” (cross between functional 
coverage and fault-injection coverage) as a measure of how many times each coverage 
item has been hit by a fault, independently if the final effect of such event is a failure or 
not. If at the end of the process a coverage item has not been cross-covered up to a 
certain threshold that means the fault list was not enough accurate. A measure of the 
cross-coverage is also important to identify critical parts of the system for which the OP 
algorithm was not accurate enough. 
8. Experimental Results 
To proof the concepts of the proposed tool, we performed a set of experiments on a 
simple router device injecting SEUs. It accepts data packets on a single input port and, 
routes the packets to one of three output channels: channel0, channel1, or channel2. 
Each channel includes a buffer used to store data to send in output. The buffer is 
implemented as a FIFO 8 x 16 (16 words of 8 bits). As target fault locations we selected 
the three FIFOs. We performed two sets of experiments both using the operational 
profile based generation. The first one adopts the collapsing algorithm proposed in 
Section 5.2, while the second one does no collapse the fault list. Obviously the 
experiments use the same workload. The aim of the experiments is to show the 
efficiency of the tool (using the Operational Profiler and the Collapser) in terms of 
injection time and percentage of fault effects1. The selected workload is device oriented 
and generated using Specman itself. It is very important to underline that the 
components used to generate the workload for the injection campaigns are exactly the 
same adopted during the functional verification, allowing high reusability. The resulting 
workload generates an equal number of packets for each channel of the router. The time 
overhead introduced by the generation of the operational profile, w.r.t. a fault free 
                                                        
1 In a campaign without collapsing the fault list; the percentage of no effect faults should be higher than under collapsed fault 
list 
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simulation, is equal to 16,3%. The operational profile generation shows that each ram is 
accessed 3216 times during the simulation. 
In order to reduce the simulation time we applied the collapsing algorithm introduced 
in Section 5.2. Figure 7 sketches the performance of the algorithm in terms of predicted 
fault effects. The chart shows for each fault location the number of candidate faults and, 
the relative number of forecasted “no effect” faults. It is easy to see that we have a 50% 
reduction of the number of real injections. The “unknown effect” corresponds to the 
actual fault-injection list. We have 1622 injections for each ram (1622 * 3 = 4886) 
instead of 3216 injections (3216 * 3 = 9648). The results of the injection campaign with 
the collapsed fault list are in Figure 8.a. The required time to perform the 4886 
simulations is about 5 hours. To show the effectiveness of the collapsing procedure, 
Figure 8.b. shows the injection results using the complete fault list (i.e. 3216 injections 
for each ram). The required simulation time was in this case of 11 hours (more than 
twice the simulation time with the collapsed fault list). Moreover, we obtained a higher 
number of “no effect” w.r.t. a data mismatch violations. 
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Figure 7: Collapsing results 
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(b) results without collapsed fault list 
Figure 8: Injection campaign results 
More complex experiments with the tool have been performed during the validation of a 
real safety critical system based on a 32-bit RISC processor. An example of results 
extrapolated by these fault-injection campaigns are: 125s of CPU time for total 
operational profile extraction, 464K total lines of operational profile, 6s of CPU time 
for total collapsing, 25K faults after collapsing, 56.6s of average single injection time 
(the workload of this example was very complex). 
 
9. Conclusions 
This paper presented a fault-injection environment based on the functionalities 
provided by EDA functional verification tools and languages. The main innovative 
features of the proposed tool are: the integration of verification and fault-injection 
methodologies in the same environment; the possibility to work with different 
description languages  and at different abstraction levels; the use of a standard 
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verification languages to model faults in a systematic and well-defined way; the use of 
Operational Profiles to generate effective and non trivial fault lists and finally the use 
of concepts of coverage to deliver precise measures about the fault-injection experiment 
completeness. Experimental results show the efficiency of the proposed flow when 
adopting collapsing rules.  
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